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Land Reform in the Twenty-First Century:
New Challenges, New Responses
Roy L. Prosterman1 & Tim Hanstad2
Global poverty is largely a rural phenomenon. Of the 1.2 billion people
in our world living in extreme poverty—earning less than US $1 per day—
approximately three-quarters live in rural areas.3 The great majority of
these poor families rely on agriculture for their sustenance and well-being.
For these families, land plays a dominant role in their economic and social
lives, and their relationship to the land largely defines their access to
opportunity, income, economic and nutritional security, and status within
the community.
How to improve and secure the relationship poor families have with land
persists as a crucial issue in much of the world. This is the central question
of “land reform.” We define “land reform” broadly to include reforms that
increase the ability of the rural poor and other socially excluded groups to
gain access and secure rights to land. Land reform has often been
understood to include only redistributing land or landownership. We also
include reforms that provide greater tenure security and rights to existing
possessors of land.
This article summarily examines the topic of land reform and its
relevance in the twenty-first century. Section one discusses the scope of the
problem. Section two summarizes the potential benefits of land reform
based on past experience and research findings. Since these potential
benefits are substantial, section three explores why land reform is so often
neglected. Section four discusses relatively recent “second generation” land
reforms that attempt to reverse earlier communist-era land reforms.
Sections five and six explore, respectively, the factors that make effective
land reform possible and the land reform design lessons learned from the
past century. These lessons learned segue into a discussion of land reform
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options in the present century and the role of foreign donors. The article
concludes that, while land reform efforts in the present century will and
should be different from those in the past, the case for land reform remains
compelling, and practical land reform options exist.

I. LAND REFORM: SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Potential land reform beneficiaries in the developing world can generally
be grouped into three categories: (1) rural households whose main source of
income is agriculture, but who lack ownership or owner-like rights to land;
(2) rural households who live on state or collective farms in communist or
formerly communist countries; and (3) rural households, particularly those
that are indigenous or pastoral, who occupy public or other land on which
they hold no formally recognized rights.
First, in less developed countries, roughly 100 million farm families,
comprising about 500 million people, lack ownership or owner-like rights to
the land they cultivate.4 Most of these farm families earn their living as
tenant farmers or agricultural laborers. The tenant farmers typically pay
high rents and have little security of land possession from season to season.
The agricultural laborers generally work for extremely low wages and are at
the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.5
These agricultural families make up one half-billion people and are
among the poorest on earth. They constitute majorities, or near majorities,
of the agricultural population in countries such as India, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, Brazil, Colombia,
Guatemala, and Honduras.6 In addition, they are a significant part of the
agricultural population in a number of other countries, ranging from
Zimbabwe and Egypt to Afghanistan, Nepal, and Venezuela.7 In countries
where they represent a large part of the agricultural population, these
landless families form a deep concentration of poverty and human suffering,
as well as an impediment to the process of economic development and, in
many settings, a potential threat to political stability.
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Although the number of desperately poor tenant farmer and agricultural
laborer families in the world today is very large, it would be much larger had
it not been for a series of major land reforms carried out over the past century.
In some of these land reforms, nearly all land reform beneficiaries ended up
with individual family farms, held in ownership or owner-like tenure. These
included land reforms in Finland, Poland, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Bolivia,
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, as well as the populous Indian states of
West Bengal and Kerala.8
In other land reforms, the great majority of land reform beneficiaries ended
up in large state or collective farms that nearly always proved to be inefficient
and authoritarian. These included land reforms in the countries of the former
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe (other than Poland and the former Yugoslavia),
Cuba, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, China, Vietnam, and North Korea.9
Second, roughly 130 million rural households (about 580 million people)
who reside in these communist or formerly communist countries10 comprise
another category of families that could benefit from land reform measures.
Over the last twenty years most of these countries have transitioned away
from command economies toward market-oriented systems (the most
prominent exceptions being Cuba and North Korea). In these transitional
economies, the “second generation” land-reform challenge is to give the
remaining roughly 130 million households who had been on state or
collective farms the right and the wherewithal to farm as individual families
with stable, long-term and transferable rights to their land. As we shall
describe further below, these “second generation” land reforms have actually
progressed much more rapidly in the past two decades than the land reform
measures still needed for tenant and laborer families in traditional lessdeveloped countries.
There is also a third, much smaller, group of agricultural families who
have insecure tenure, often on public lands. Some of these families are
economically desperate “squatters” who have moved onto the land to
cultivate it. Others are traditional landholders, often indigenous groups,
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who have occupied the land for decades or more and hold rights recognized
by customary law, but not adequately recognized by the state’s formal laws.
We also include in this category some traditional pastoralists who use land
in extensive or migratory patterns, but without sufficiently recognized
group tenure rights to the land. In some cases, these holders are now in
conflict with settlers, ranchers, loggers, or miners who more recently came
upon the land to extract resources or who otherwise disrupt existing use
patterns (for example, in parts of Indonesia, Brazil, and the Philippines).
This third category of families who could benefit from land reform
measures includes roughly 25 million households, or about 125 million
people.11
Table 1 broadly summarizes both those who have ownership or ownerlike rights and those who are in the categories of potential land reform
beneficiaries discussed above.
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Table 1. Approximate Number of Rural Households Worldwide Subject to
Land Tenure Problems (millions of families).
Landless or Insecure use
rights

Owners
or
ownerlike
rights

Insecure
tenants,
agricultural
laborers

Insecure
individual
use rights
or still
collective
farmers

Squatters
and
insecure
traditional
holders

Total

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

Transition
(formerly
centrally
planned)
economies:

95

n/a

130

5

230

Other
developing
countries

180

100

n/a

20

300

Total:

275

230

25 ?

530

Our principal focus in this article is upon: (1) households of agricultural
laborers and insecure tenant farmers; and (2) households of current or
former collective-farm workers who lack secure land rights. These two
categories—columns (c) and (d) of Table 1—comprise the great bulk of
households lacking a secure and predictable relationship to the land. This
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article deals only briefly with some aspects of the problems “squatters” and
insecure traditional holders face.
Nearly all of the foregoing tenure insecurity issues are essentially
situations where the rights of cultivators, considered as unitary households,
require definition and protection as against the rights or powers exercised
by private landlords, plantation owners, collective farm managers, local
cadres, the state, or other external actors. In addition, there exists an
important intra-household land tenure issue—the issue of gender, which
concerns the relative land rights and powers exercised by wives, daughters,
widows, and female heads-of-household. We shall also address this oftenneglected and important aspect of the land-tenure issue.

II. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF LAND REFORM
Agricultural land still constitutes the primary source of income, status,
and security for over half a billion families outside of the developed
world.12 As Table 1 reflects, nearly half of those families are either landless
or have insecure rights to the land on which they depend for their
livelihood. It should not be surprising to find that in improving the stability
of tenure relationships, land reform can improve lives in a number of ways.
Decisively improving the relationship of cultivators to land through land
reform has generally led to many crucial benefits, such as:
• increased crop production13 and improved nutrition for poor
households;14
• “ladders out of poverty” and a foundation for sustained and
inclusive economic growth;15
• grassroots empowerment and movement towards more
democratic societies;16
• reduced social unrest and instability;17
• reduced urban migration;
• better environmental stewardship;18
• and creation of wealth.19
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In sum, secure and stable access to land provides a foundation for better
livelihoods and living conditions. It also helps the rural poor to benefit
from broad-based economic growth.
A. Increased Crop Production and Nutritional Welfare
With regard to crop productivity gains, there is cogent international
evidence linking land reform with increased crop production. First, smaller
holdings generally produce more than larger ones, whether measured hectare
for hectare or according to total factor productivity.20 Second, and related,
family-operated farms generally produce more than collective farms and
farms largely dependent on wage labor.21 Third, on any given holding, a
cultivator with ownership or secure, long-term, owner-like tenure is far more
likely to make long-term capital and “sweat-equity” investments that improve
and conserve the land than is a cultivator with insecure tenure.22 Finally, a
cultivator with ownership or owner-like tenure is more likely to use improved
(and more expensive) seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs than is a tenant in the
typical tenancy arrangement where the tenant pays for all inputs and receives
only a portion of the output.23
In sum, total production per hectare and total factor productivity are highest
on farms owned and operated by a single family. In developing countries
where the ratio of agricultural population to arable land is typically high, these
farms are also small. When policymakers in developing or transitional
countries argue (as they sometimes do) that there are inherent “economies of
scale” in large farms, or envision (as they also sometimes do) big, mechanized
farms as the “ideal” to be achieved, they are demonstrably wrong. Such
views are contradicted by the vast weight of evidence. They also disregard
the comparative strengths of societies that lack substantial amounts of land
and capital but have abundant and underemployed labor, especially rural
labor. This is the case in many if not most developing countries. In such
settings, the highly motivated application of intensive family labor to a small
piece of land owned or held securely by that family is precisely what makes

VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 2 • 2006

769

770 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

economic sense. What typically makes little or no sense in such a society is
large-scale mechanized farming, which requires scarce capital and displaces
abundant labor that has no alternative employment.
Additionally, apart from likely increases in crop productivity, research
shows that access to land through ownership or owner-like tenure has a
substantial impact on family nutrition.24 Land reform in traditional settings
can improve the lives of beneficiary families, typically among the poorest of
the poor, by letting them keep a significant portion of the crop that would
otherwise go to the landlord or plantation owner or by enabling them to
produce food on land (including house-and-garden plots) to which they
previously did not have access.
B. Foundation for Economic Growth
Cogent comparative evidence also demonstrates that broadening access
to land and strengthening cultivators’ land rights can generate increases in
overall economic activity.25 As a broad base of agricultural families
benefiting from land reform receive higher incomes, they enter the
marketplace to purchase goods and services, ranging from improved
housing to schoolbooks, from bicycles to sewing machines.26 This
increased demand stimulates the creation of non-farm employment. Thus, a
dynamic family farming sector has significant forward and backward
linkages to broader societal development. Research confirms that a broadbased distribution of land assets not only benefits the poor but becomes a
solid basis for sustained and inclusive economic growth.
C. Facilitating Democracy
Land reform, when it is implemented effectively, removes its
beneficiaries from the control and “power domain” of the landlord,
plantation owner, local cadre, or collective-farm manager.27 Further, as
land-reform beneficiaries increase their incomes and become more
economically secure and confident, their ability to participate in the political
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process is strengthened.28 Initially, land reform beneficiaries may be
empowered to make demands for a fairer share of government-administered
programs and services. Land reform creates more secure and self-confident
producers who are willing to challenge the inertia, elitism, and neglect that
frequently characterize the politics of underdevelopment. The contribution
made by land reform to eventual democratization of previously
authoritarian societies has perhaps been seen most dramatically in the cases
of Taiwan and South Korea.29
D. Reducing Instability and Conflict
In traditional developing countries, land reform has reduced political
instability by eliminating basic grievances arising from the relationship
between tenants or agricultural laborers and erstwhile landowners. Many of
the past century’s most violent civil conflicts ensued when land issues were
ignored.30 Land reform can address the most basic rural grievances and
increase citizen commitment to a system in which economic and social
demands are negotiated peacefully.
Classic civil wars catalyzed and fed largely by land-based grievances
such as those that occurred in Mexico, Spain, China, and Vietnam may be
less likely with the fading of revolutionary Marxism as a mobilizing
ideology. Nonetheless, such land-based grievances still lend themselves to
manipulation by ideologues or demagogues who seek domestic power in
places like Nepal and Zimbabwe.31 More frequently, unsolved land
grievances now lead to various forms of “low intensity violence,” such as
spontaneous land invasions in Brazil, peasant alliances with drug lords in
Colombia, or desperate migrants seizing indigenous lands in the Philippines
or Indonesia.32 Research also confirms that overall inequality in assets is
associated with higher crime rates.33
More ominously, in this new century, such land-based grievances may
now be increasingly mobilized by religious extremism and turned either
inwards against domestic governments (such as Pakistan) or outwards
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against the United States and other democracies. Such terrorist recruitment
relates not to the veneer of leadership at the top, often drawn from the
wealthy or the middle class, but to the establishment of a mass base or rankand-file, which gives terrorist movements much greater resilience and
staying power.34 Often this recruitment process may be mediated through
the kind of flight to the cities that results from the “push” of desperate
poverty in the rural areas rather than the “pull” of urban job opportunities.
This flight is likely to disproportionately affect the landless (and their young
sons). For example, landlessness is the best predictor of rural poverty in
India35 — better than illiteracy or caste — and it is likely the best predictor
in other settings such as Pakistan, Egypt, and Indonesia.
E. Other Benefits
Land reform can provide at least three additional benefits. First, and
closely related to the point just made, many landless families are driven by
their poverty into the cities.36 Effective land reform measures give landless
agricultural families a stake in their village society, reducing pressures that
lead to premature and excessive urbanization.
Second, long-term, secure rights to land set the stage for environmental
stewardship and sustainable farming practices. Moreover, in specific
settings such as Brazil, Indonesia, or the Philippines, reallocation of secure
rights to existing cultivated land may also have an important environmental
impact through forestalling landless peasants from descending on, cutting
down, and burning the forest in the desperate search for a piece of land to
farm.37 The latter is a form of escape parallel to the desperate flight to
cities.
Third, secure land rights that are transferable also acquire a predictable
market value and can be used as collateral, “cashed out” for non-agricultural
investment or retirement, or passed on as wealth to the next generation. So,
by clarifying and strengthening existing informal and/or weak land rights,
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governments can create wealth for the poor and bring “dead capital” to
life.38
The benefits of land reform described here apply, in general, not only to
land reforms carried out to benefit tenant farmers and agricultural laborers in
traditional less-developed countries but also to land reforms that permit
former collective farm workers in transitional economies to obtain secure
rights to land of their own. They too invest, increase production, gain
income, consume more, become empowered and less aggrieved, increase their
stewardship, and strengthen their rural attachments.
Secure long-term land rights are not, by themselves, sufficient to achieve
all these multiple benefits; but in most settings—both traditional and
transitional—they are a necessary precondition for the achievement of many
or most of them. Land reform is not a panacea or a silver bullet, but it is a
foundational element for effective economic and social development in a
multitude of settings.

III. WHY THEN IS LAND REFORM SO OFTEN NEGLECTED?
Despite the importance of the rural poor’s land grievances in so many
diverse settings and the multiple development goals served by land reform,
the topic receives little notice in industrialized democracies. Foreign policy
experts, the media, and even foreign aid programs pay relatively little
attention to land reform issues. The rare exception often arises in cases
where the issue has become a focus of violence or demagoguery, as in
Zimbabwe recently.39 Massive programs of reform—such as the current
program to give long-term, secure land rights to China’s 210 million farm
families,40 now nearly halfway to completion—receive hardly a single line
of print or frame of television coverage in the media of the developed
countries.
Several factors contribute to the studied lack of attention from developed
countries. Substantial land grievances, unlike ongoing development issues
such as eradication of disease, family planning, and international debt, tend
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to arise in their conspicuous form only at discrete moments in time. Thus,
the media and the public and foreign aid agencies do not consistently focus
on the need for programmatic responses. The media and public, in
particular, are sorely lacking in education on the continuing importance of
meaningful land reform in developing and transitional economies.
Where the land issue does finally receive some attention, it is often
because it has been seized upon and dramatized by demagogues or violent
elements. This may be, in part, a result of ignoring an ongoing, systemic
problem until the frustrations of the aggrieved finally “boil over.” In these
cases, the land reform issue, instead of being the subject of thoughtful
study, planning, and response via a non-violent and democratic alternative,
is likely to generate a negative reaction as being “what the bad elements
want.”
Additionally, developed countries often ignore the land reform issue
because it is politically controversial among developing country elites.
Local leadership and elites in developing countries are often opposed to any
serious land reform measures because the reform may threaten, or is
perceived to threaten, their individual or family interests. Such opposition
and the related political controversy and sensitivity it engenders have
tended to make both bilateral and multilateral foreign-aid agencies shy away
from public focus on the land reform issue as too controversial, even where
they privately recognize its importance. This is especially true in traditional
less-developed countries where land reform options center on redistributing
private land.
Second-generation reforms in the former command
economies, because they typically consist of state-owned land, involve
relatively less political controversy and thus have received somewhat more
attention from foreign-aid agencies.
Past flawed and unsuccessful land reform efforts also sometimes taint
“land reform” and cause policymakers to ignore it as a development option.
Numerous countries have had less than successful experiences with land
reform.41 The lack of success is typically due to design flaws, insufficient
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political will, or ineffective implementation, factors which are often
interrelated. In some cases, these ineffective land reforms have led to real
or perceived negative consequences, such as violence or highly regulated
land markets.42 Based on failed and flawed earlier attempts, policymakers
sometimes (and unfortunately) choose to ignore land reform as an option
altogether rather than address the flaws in the earlier efforts.
Like many other needed structural or redistributive reforms, experience
indicates that the long-term societal gains from effective redistributive land
reform far outweigh the short-term pains relating to political sensitivity or
controversy. Political realities, however, do not always allow for much
needed reforms that make long-term economic and social sense. In many
cases, the political obstacles can be overcome, as discussed in Section V,
below. Policymakers, activists, and potential beneficiaries should not
despair, however, if the political obstacles to achieving land reforms that are
sweeping and comprehensive cannot be overcome. Instead, it is crucial to
recognize a variety of less ambitious land reform measures that may still be
capable of providing widespread and effective benefits, as discussed below
in Section VII.

IV. “SECOND GENERATION” LAND REFORMS
The comprehensive twentieth century land reforms that were carried out
without collectivization43 played a major role in fostering development and
stability.44 Land reforms that led to collectivization proved almost universally
to be failures.45 Many countries that previously conducted collectivized land
reforms are now undertaking “second generation” reforms aimed at
reorganizing state and collective farms into family-size units and introducing
market-oriented land systems.46 These second generation land reforms now
appear to be playing a major beneficial role in many formerly collectivized
countries, most notably for the approximately 210 million farm households of
China.47
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China’s farm families worked on large agricultural communes or collective
farms from about 1955 to 1980.48 During 1980–83, China pursued a
decollectivization process through which the state distributed virtually all land
of the collectives to each farm family in individual landholdings.49
Unfortunately, the families received insecure rights to the land.50 Local
officials could relocate them from plot to plot through periodic
“readjustments” in the name of maintaining absolute equality of distribution
as household size changed. The results of the rural reforms, particularly the
land tenure reforms, are impressive both in themselves and as considered by
world standards. China’s gross agricultural output value increased, in
constant inflation-adjusted terms, by 86 percent from 1980 to 1990.51 China
is now about halfway through completing a major new land reform that is
giving these families, totaling about 850 million persons, secure and
transferable thirty-year use rights.52
Extensive decollectivization, with the granting of individual ownership or
long-term use rights to farmers, has also occurred in the past two decades in
Vietnam, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Armenia.53 Land reform has made much less
progress in Russia and Ukraine, and still less in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and
Belarus.54

V. FACTORS THAT MAKE LAND REFORM POSSIBLE
While the need for land reform remains great in many countries, the
political obstacles are often substantial. However, lack of political will or
the existence of substantial political controversy were also present shortly
before many non-violent, democratic land reforms in the latter half of the
twentieth century.55 Factors that played important roles in overcoming
political and other obstacles to land reform in recent decades may provide
lessons as we assess prospects for twenty-first century land reform efforts.
Over the last half of the twentieth century, there have been at least eight
such factors.
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Grassroots support for land reform and linkages with political parties.
Building or harnessing widespread grassroots support for land-reform
measures (for example, through local civil society organizations) and forming
linkages to political parties have been important factors in determining
whether land reform measures will be adopted and whether land reform, once
legislated, will actually be implemented. Grassroots support from civil
society organizations and political linkages were significant in the success of
land reforms in El Salvador and the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal,
as well as in many of the transitional economies of Eastern Europe where
decollectivization and privatization of land have been carried out.56
Grassroots support is likely to be even more important in the future for two
reasons. First, many countries where land reform is still needed are political
democracies. Second, advances in communications technology now allow
non-governmental organizations (NGO) to organize and publicize the
conditions of the rural poor more effectively than they did in the past.
Political will for land reform vested in a strong central authority. Political
will for land reform vested in a strong central authority, such as General
MacArthur in Japan or Chiang Kai-Shek in Taiwan, has been important in the
past. Authoritative action from the center may still play a key role in settings
such as China, but in the future this variable seems likely to be of diminishing
importance given the international trend toward more democratic forms of
governance.
The threat of strong revolutionary movements drawing support from
grievances of the landless. The threat of revolutionary uprising has
sometimes played an important role in making land reform politically
possible. Willingness to seriously consider land reform in the Philippines
over past decades seems to have risen along with the fortunes of rural
revolutionaries.57 The guerrilla threat was also a factor in making land reform
politically feasible in both El Salvador in the 1980s and South Vietnam in the
early 1970s.58 With the general demise of revolutionary Marxism, this
variable of impending revolution appears to have receded in significance and,
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in any case, has little relevance to “second generation” land reforms. If
religious extremism comes to take the place of revolutionary Marxism in
mobilizing the grievances of the landless, however, this variable could well
resurface with considerable importance in countries such as Pakistan,
Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, and Afghanistan.
Adequate compensation paid for land expropriated. The amount of
compensation paid to landowners from whom land is taken is a critical
variable. Over time, evidence has accumulated that the “carrot” of paying
adequate compensation to those whose land is taken can be more influential
than the “stick” of a perceived revolutionary threat or land occupations.59
Lack of adequate financing for land reform has often limited otherwise
possible land reform efforts. In particular, providing adequate compensation
for the taking of privately owned land may reduce landowner opposition and
help legitimize reform for significant sectors of public opinion, thereby
substantially reducing the amount of grassroots pressure or central-authority
determination otherwise necessary to accomplish a given degree of reform.
The feasibility of this “carrot” has been reduced in recent years, however, by
substantial increases in the value of privately owned land in many countries,
especially in settings where there is high population pressure on land. This
has reduced the quantity of land that can be acquired with a given amount of
financing. As a result, new and imaginative approaches to land reform design
that take into account how much land must be distributed to provide essential
benefits to most of the needy group must be considered. These implications
are discussed in Section VI.
Ideology. Ideology has played an important role in democratic land reform
in much of Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union. There, some
post-communist governments have espoused an active policy of
decollectivization, sometimes linked to restitution of land rights to former
owners of small and medium farms (or their heirs) who lost land during
collectivization.60 However, non-restitutive approaches that allocate land to
whomever presently works on the collective farm (whether or not they are
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descended from the former owners) are likely to be far easier to administer.
They are also more likely to lead to small farms that are owner-cultivated
rather than being leased-in from heirs (beneficiaries of restitution) who reside
in urban areas.
Public education and information. Public education can be an important
factor in making land reform possible, especially in democratic settings.
Educating the public and policymakers that land reform can bring extensive
economic and social benefits may help crystallize the political will to carry
out land reform. Public education will be a crucial factor in the twenty-first
century.
Availability of technical assistance. Likewise, the availability of technical
assistance can be an important factor in making land reform possible. Factgrounded advisory work that makes policymakers, as well as the public,
aware of specific solutions to technical issues involved in particular land
reform settings may not only help to crystallize the necessary political will but
help to ensure that a land reform program is designed in such a way that it can
actually be implemented. Such technical assistance can also be crucial to the
development of training, monitoring, dispute resolution, and other measures
that help facilitate effective implementation of land reform programs.
Support from international donors. Finally, external support, both for
technical assistance and needed financing, can be another important
variable. Support and encouragement from the United States played an
important role in the South Vietnamese and Salvadoran land reforms, as
well as in the post-World War II reforms in Japan, Taiwan, and South
Korea. Currently, land reform measures in some of the transitional
economies are a part of market reforms receiving support from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as well as the
European Union in preparation for accession. Such external support has
been rare in recent years in traditional developing countries, but there have
been signs of renewed interest, such as the World Bank’s support for
voluntary, “market-assisted” land reform in several countries including
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India, Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa (discussed in Section VII
below).61 In addition, the recognition that the grievances of the landless
poor mobilized through radical religious movements may ultimately pose a
threat to world order could have an impact at the international level.

VI. LAND REFORM DESIGN: LESSONS FROM THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
Mustering the political will to undertake land reform is a threshold issue.
However, policymakers must also consider how to design land reform
interventions. While each country setting is unique and needs specifically
tailored interventions, past land reform efforts do offer some general
lessons. We first highlight a dozen basic points relating to land reforms
carried out in traditional less-developed countries during the twentieth
century. Then, we turn to similarities and differences of “second
generation” land reforms now underway in transitional economies.
A. Lessons From Traditional Less-Developed Countries
1. If redistributive land reform is to provide benefits to a substantial
portion of the rural landless, there has rarely been an effective substitute
for the mandatory (but compensated) taking of private land as the basis for
redistribution. Countries sometimes pursue other alternatives, including
distribution of or “resettlement” on uncultivated public lands, strict
regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship, or voluntary sale and
purchase of land through “land bank” or “market-assisted” mechanisms.
Such alternatives can provide important benefits, but they have rarely
provided widespread beneficial impacts. Resettlement programs have
generally been costly, disruptive, and environmentally damaging.62
Ongoing regulation of the continuing landlord-tenant relationship has
usually proven impractical and even counter-productive.63 “Marketassisted,” “negotiated,” or “community-led” land reform initiatives (in
which poor households are provided subsidies to make private purchases of
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land) are relatively new and innovative efforts. They have not yet proven
effective for redistributing substantial amounts of land, although they are
worthy of further experimentation.64 Where political, social, or economic
realities do not allow for sweeping redistributive land reforms based on
mandatory, compensated takings of private land, “second-best” or less
comprehensive measures should be pursued.
2. The state should provide reasonable compensation to private
landowners whose land is taken for redistribution. Failure to pay
reasonable compensation virtually guarantees that landlords will evade the
law, cause the law to be rescinded, or violently resist enforcement of the
law. This compensation need not always equal full market value, but the
program design should carefully consider both market value and the flow of
income from the land. Payment of substantially less than “market value”
may often be sufficient to produce the same ongoing flow of income that
had been produced by the land taken, but this may be inadequate in those
settings where there is a large gap between market value and the lesser
capital fund needed to reproduce the annual income flow.
In many settings, particularly Asian settings, where population pressure on
the land is fierce, market values may considerably exceed the capitalized flow
of income from the land. It may then be essential to pay full market value and
to design the land reform in ways that make it nonetheless affordable, as
discussed in the fifth point below. On the other hand, there may be other
settings (particularly in Latin America or Africa) where much privately
owned land is not intensively used and where market values for such land are
quite low and affordable. Moreover, land reform programs that provide
market or near-market value for land are more likely to be able to be
implemented over varying and longer periods of time, if necessary, than land
reforms that are significantly confiscatory. This is because the latter may be
possible only in narrow “windows of time” when special factors exist, such as
a very strong central authority with limited ties to rural landowners, or a threat
of revolutionary upheaval drawing upon the grievances of the landless.
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Three further points should be noted regarding compensation. First, if a
portion of compensation to owners is deferred and paid in government bonds,
those bonds should be inflation-adjusting, and former landowners should
probably be able to use a portion of the bond as preferred collateral in
obtaining loans for various productive investments.
Second, in most settings, beneficiaries should also be required to repay the
government something for the land, with the possible exception of cases
where the very poor receive very small plots, discussed also in the fifth point
below.
Finally, democratic and redistributive land reforms should be carried out in
the spirit of an eminent domain proceeding in which it is understood that
certain lands need to be acquired for application to an important social
purpose. Democratic land reform should not be conducted in the spirit of
judging the present large landowners or financially penalizing them.
3. If possible, land reform should be of sufficient scope and universality to
reach most potential beneficiaries. This means that agricultural laborers,
tenants, and non-permanent laborers as well as permanent ones, should
benefit from the process. Benefits, however, need not be uniform. For
example, in the Keralan land reform in India, tenant farmers received fullsized parcels, while some agricultural laborers received small house-andgarden plots.65
4. Providing even very small plots can produce substantial benefits.
Agricultural laborers in the Indian state of Kerala who received tiny houseand-garden plots of 1/10 acre (.04 hectare or about 4,350 square feet) found
themselves considerably better off in terms of income, family nutrition, and
status.66 Similar findings have come from recent research in the Indian states
of Karnataka and West Bengal.67 In Karnataka, agricultural laborer families
who received government-granted house-and-garden plots of only 1/25 acre
(.016 hectares or about 1,730 square feet) were able to satisfy most of the
family’s nutritional needs for vegetable, fruits, and dairy products and obtain
cash income equivalent to one full-time adult wage from plant and animal
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products on the tiny plot.68 Strong supporting evidence on the benefits of
owning small house-and-garden plots exists from such diverse settings as
Russia, Indonesia, and the Caribbean.69
5. The maximum per-family quantity of land allocated to beneficiaries
should be the amount a family can intensively farm with its own labor and
modest capital. Some land reforms have provided per-family holdings far
larger than necessary. The distribution of large holdings can severely limit
the number of potential beneficiaries. Rather than providing an idealized
holding size, it is generally better to calculate the area likely to be available
under the particular land reform’s acquisition formula and divide that amount
by the number of families needing land. The resulting quotient should be the
maximum for per-family allocations. (One private report criticized the 1980–
81 land reform in El Salvador for not giving a “vital minimum” of nine
hectares to each beneficiary family, without realizing that such a pattern of
distribution would have required distributing twice the land area of the entire
country.70) Governments should recognize that every recipient family will be
made substantially better off than they presently are, even if the size of their
new holding is not “ideal” or “viable” as a sole source of income. Land
reform neither creates nor destroys land. It puts an existing agricultural
population into a relationship with an existing land base that is more fair and
more productive than it was before.
6. Minimize costs per beneficiary family in order to benefit the maximum
number of landless rural families. Available resources should be focused
initially on the sine qua non of acquiring land for redistribution. Land reform
beneficiaries often require some ancillary support for interventions such as
credit and technical assistance. However, program designers must avoid
allocating excessive resources per family to such ancillary programs and may
need to omit entirely some costly benefits such as new housing. A universal
experience in successful land reforms is that families that gain ownership,
even of a very small plot, build their own house, starting with something very
simple and progressing to a more substantial dwelling over time. Faced with
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a choice between spending “x” amount of resources to give one family land
and a house, or four families land but no house, it seems clear that program
designers should opt for land-only benefits to the maximum number of
families.
7. Focus on intra-household allocations of land rights. Most past land
reform programs, even those cited as successes, have ignored the intrahousehold allocation of land rights. Women possess limited rights to land
throughout much of the world, even though they are often responsible for
producing much of the food.71 It is important to understand how reform or
reallocation of land rights may impact women differently than men and to
ensure that the reform avoids discriminating against women. Providing
women with strong legal rights to land can have important security,
efficiency, welfare, and employment effects.72 One basic step toward
promoting equitable intra-household allocation of resources is to ensure that
any land distributed through land reform programs is jointly titled in the
names of both husband and wife, or even independently titled in the name
of a woman, rather than in the single name of the “head of household,” who
is usually male.
8. Understand, consider, and—to the extent possible—incorporate
customary law and land tenure regimes when undertaking land reform
initiatives. Some land reforms have involved attempts to replace customary
land-tenure regimes that still exist in some parts of the world—especially
areas of less population density—with more “modernized” land rights.73
While some changes over time may be appropriate, it is vital to recognize that
most customary land-tenure regimes have evolved over long periods, and that
such regimes can function with a high degree of equity and environmental
awareness. Rather than wholesale replacement of customary regimes in the
name of modernization, new written law should generally attempt to
incorporate or defer to customary law and legal institutions, while at the same
time recognizing that “custom” itself has the characteristic of adaptability and
often changes over time.
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9. Program administration should involve beneficiaries, serve
beneficiaries, and be well-publicized to beneficiaries. Farmer-dominated,
local-level committees with strong representation of the beneficiaries are in
the best position to determine who owns the land, who has been cultivating it,
and what it produces.74 In some settings, grassroots farmer unions or
organizations of agricultural laborers may play this role. Beneficiaries should
not be required to leave the locality to fill out applications for benefits, nor
should they be required to fill out applications under the watchful (and often
intimidating) eyes of local elites. The applications should be simple and the
program should include repeated publicization of the land reform program
and beneficiaries’ rights at the local level using local media and other means
that will effectively communicate such information.
10. Avoid excessive restrictions on land sale and lease markets. Past land
reforms often placed restrictions on the beneficiaries’ ability to sell or lease
the land. Such restrictions can have perverse results even if they are intended
to “protect” the beneficiaries. Land reform programs have often imposed
restrictions on selling and leasing to prevent improvident sales by the new,
small landowners or to thwart the growth of new “exploitative” tenancy
arrangements.75 While some limited and especially time-bound restrictions
on land markets can be warranted under special circumstances, excessive
restrictions can deprive farmers of access to credit (by preventing mortgage of
the land rights) and can reduce the ability of farmers to adjust the size of their
farm in response to economic and agronomic conditions. Paralleling the right
to sell, mortgage should be allowed for both productive investments and the
purchase of additional land.
11. Do not force or pressure land reform beneficiaries to adopt a
particular mode of organizing their farms. Most beneficiaries are likely to
choose to create individual family farms.76 Some, however, may choose
extended family operations or collective modes of production, at least
initially. Farmers are best suited to make organizational decisions regarding
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their farms. The legal framework should support a variety of alternatives for
farm organization.
12. Collect, monitor, and analyze data during all phases of the program.
Before completing design of the program, designers should collect overall
data regarding the number and composition of landless and land-poor
families, distribution and concentration of land ownership, as well as
production, rents, and income from land. In addition, after program
implementation begins, it is important for program administrators to conduct
ongoing monitoring to evaluate both the progress and the impact of the
reforms. Such systematic monitoring and evaluation is crucial for identifying
problems and providing information necessary for program refinement.
B.

Lessons from Transitional Economies

Second generation land reforms in transitional economies involve many,
but not all, of the same program design issues. The land to be redistributed
is normally owned by the state or by the dissolving collective, so it is
usually unnecessary for the state to purchase the land. Some program
design issues, however, deserve emphasis:
1. Aim for universal or near-universal coverage of the potential
beneficiaries. Universality can be achieved in two ways. First, all members
of the state farm or collective farm, including pensioners, should be given a
right to receive land individually. Some Eastern European countries have
complicated this step by giving preference to pre-collectivization land
owners and their heirs.77 The second factor to consider in achieving
universality is to include all or nearly all state farm and collective farm land
in the redistribution. A few countries, such as Russia, have exempted large
portions of this land from the redistribution program and thus limited the
program scope.78
2. Land market development issues are more important in second
generation reforms. In particular, it is important to build the necessary legal
and policy framework and institutional mechanisms to enable farmers to
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transfer land rights by lease, sale, inheritance, and mortgage. The creation of
such frameworks and institutions can be difficult in settings where land
markets have not existed for decades.79
3. Allow state or collective farm members to exercise various options on a
continuing basis, including options to farm collectively, to withdraw their
land as part of a small group, or to withdraw their land to create a family
farm. This is particularly important in settings where the state farms or
collective farms have not broken up quickly or decisively. At a minimum,
state or collective farm members (or heirs of former small owners under a
restitution program) should not have to make an irrevocable decision at the
beginning of the land reform process regarding how he or she will exercise
the new land rights.
4. Permit and foster efforts by state or collective farm members to
conclude interim arrangements. These transitional arrangements could
include short-term leasing to the state or collective farm, or its corporate
successor, while the member decides what to do with the land in the longer
term. State or collective farm members must be adequately informed of their
alternatives and not forced into a particular choice by the farm management.
5. Permit collective farm members to withdraw a fair share of the
collective farm’s animals, machines, and other non-land assets together with
the member’s share of the land. Collective farm members are unlikely to be
able to pursue other options without such non-land assets. Moreover, the
concept of collective ownership should provide the basis for their right to
claim a share of these collectively owned assets.
6. Important principles of gender equality, participatory administration,
program monitoring, and sensitive treatment of customary law also apply to
second generation reforms in transitional economies. These important
program design issues, highlighted in Section VI.A in the context of more
traditional land reform settings, are equally important for second generation
reforms. Women should receive at least equal rights to distributed land;
programs should be administered by local, beneficiary-dominated
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committees; program progress and impacts should be carefully and
regularly monitored; and customary law regimes should be treated
sensitively and not summarily replaced.

VII. NEW LAND REFORM OPTIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
For most of the twentieth century, the dominant methodology for
conducting land reform in non-Marxist settings was compulsory acquisition
of defined lands from private landlords or plantation owners, often at a sharp
discount from market value, and redistribution of such lands to tenant farmers
or agricultural laborers in farms whose size approximated that of small-tomedium sized farms in that country. Sometimes land reform also meant
compulsory regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship in an effort to
elevate and protect tenants’ rights or resettlement of tenants or laborers onto
(supposedly) uncultivated public lands. The latter approaches, in particular,
were nearly always unsuccessful.
Although land reform faded as a development priority in many parts of the
globe during the 1980s, the world witnessed a renewed interest in land reform
near the end of the twentieth century.80 It seems likely that this interest will
be sustained through the first part of the twenty-first century.
The land reform approaches in the new century, however, involve both new
challenges (such as those in the decollectivizing and market-creating
transitional economies) and new responses. The approaches are likely to be
substantially revised from those that dominated the past century. Such a new
set of approaches should begin by reaffirming that the provision of secure
land rights (ownership or owner-like tenure) to the roughly 230 million
households in the developing and transitional economies81 is one of the
highest economic development priorities.
Policymakers should also
recognize that the provision of secure land rights may be necessary for the
maintenance of political stability in many countries.
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In pursuing the new land reform approaches, policymakers should learn
from cumulative past experience and be advertent to current needs in a
number of ways.
Large-scale land reform programs that redistribute a large proportion of a
country’s privately owned agricultural land to tenant farmers or landless
laborers are unlikely to be politically feasible in most, but not all, settings.
In countries that had previously undertaken land reforms that collectivized
agricultural land and production, second generation land reform programs that
undo the damage caused by involuntary collectivization in the transitional
economies will continue to be a central challenge. Such programs are likely
to include: (1) provision of longer-term, more secure, and transferable land
rights in countries that have already decollectivized, such as China and
Vietnam; (2) measures to facilitate voluntary decollectivization in countries
where that has not yet happened, such as Russia and Ukraine; and (3)
measures to introduce alternatives to collectivization for the first time in the
few settings, such as North Korea, where such alternatives do not yet exist.
In many settings, it will be necessary to establish or strengthen land market
prerequisites, including secondary institutions such as land registration and
mortgage that will help support, protect, and add value to land rights.
In country settings with large numbers of rural, landless households,
political and financial factors will likely make distribution of micro-plots—
including house-and-garden plots—more feasible and desirable than
continuing efforts to distribute “full-sized” small farms. Even tiny plots (as
small as 0.06 to 0.25 acre) can, in many settings, provide a substantial
increment to family nutrition and income, increased status and wage
bargaining power, freedom from moneylenders, and a place for one’s own
house. Such measures can be affordable even if the state must pay relatively
high market values for land to be redistributed. Although a redistribution of
very small plots cannot carry the full range of benefits described in Section II,
the existing evidence strongly suggests that there is a rather steep “benefits
curve” in which even a modest initial land endowment produces a high

VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 2 • 2006

789

790 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

proportion of many of these benefits. Developing country policymakers
should also consider introducing this “micro-plot” concept into existing rural
development programs such as rural housing and income generation
programs. The failed approach of resettling land-poor farmers and laborers
onto distant, uncultivated public land should be largely abandoned, except in
very special and compelling circumstances.
Failed attempts to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship should also be
abandoned, except in special and compelling circumstances. For example, in
the Indian state of West Bengal, the state should either retain tenancy
regulation for remaining tenants, since the costs of evictions have already
been borne, or, even better, provide the protected tenants with realistic options
for becoming full owners. In settings where past tenancy reform approaches
have unintentionally led to negative consequences, the state may need to undo
aspects of the failed reforms. For example, Indian states should consider
removing the most onerous legislative restrictions and prohibitions on tenancy
in order to provide greater opportunity and freedom for land-poor farmers to
access land through rental markets.
States should pay more attention to safeguarding and assuring customary
land rights of the poor, including rights to forestland and grazing land. Thus,
in addition to redistributive land reform that helps the poor to gain access to
new land, efforts are needed to help the poor formalize or otherwise protect
their existing customary rights to land. States are increasingly recognizing
that group or communal rights may be the best option for traditional
pastoralists who use grazing land in extensive or migratory patterns,
accompanied with appropriate licensing or access restrictions.82
Policymakers have recently and belatedly begun to pay attention to intrahousehold allocation of land rights. This should continue and increase, with
efforts to ensure greater rights for women in the enjoyment, disposition,
partitioning, and inheritance of land.
Policymakers in many countries will need to undertake more systematic
attempts to find timely compromise solutions to forestall violent,
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confiscatory, and anti-democratic efforts to secure land for the poor
(including efforts that may lead to backlashes that further undermine
democracy, the rule of law, and the position of the poor).
Rare cases may still exist where land is cheap and plentiful enough (such as
unused or grossly underutilized land in parts of South America or Africa) to
allow the state to employ the old approach of redistributing “full-sized” farms
to a large number of beneficiaries. In such cases, however, the state should
compensate existing owners whose land is mandatorily acquired by paying
the owners either the market value, or very close to the market value, of their
land.
Policymakers should also recognize that there could be a potentially
important, supplementary role for “market assisted land reform” or
“negotiated land reform.” In these approaches, the state removes policy
distortions that inflate land prices and provides funding to needy families to
acquire private land being voluntarily offered for sale. Such schemes require
further testing in pilot projects before being widely pursued.
The state should assist land reform beneficiaries with simple
complementary measures, but not attempt to be the provider of all services to
land reform beneficiaries. For example, the state may need to provide some
support for credit, extension, or basic infrastructure (such as extending simple,
local roads and electrification lines from existing residential areas to newly
distributed house-and-garden plots). However, all such interventions should
be conducted with an eye to keeping costs-per-beneficiary at a level that
allows for universal or near-universal coverage to those requiring benefits.
Private providers and the beneficiaries themselves have important roles to
play.
The Costs of Land Reform
Based upon the approaches outlined above, we very roughly estimate the
costs of a comprehensive global effort to provide land to those in need. The
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costs can be divided into three categories: land costs, costs of complementary
measures (roads, electricity, agricultural extension), and administrative costs.
Beginning with land costs, we estimate that there are roughly 100 million
agricultural laborer or insecure tenant households in traditional developing
countries. Let us assume that 10 million of such families (10 percent of the
total) live in settings where land prices are low enough to allow the state to
provide them with full-sized farms for land compensation costs averaging
$400 per family. Total land costs for these 10 million families would be
about $4 billion (10 million x $400).
The remaining 90 million households, living in settings where land prices
are relatively high and where little or no public land is available for
allocation, might be given average one-tenth acre homestead-cum-garden
plots or field plots that the state has acquired through eminent domain
proceedings (or by purchasing on the market) and upon payment of full
market value, at a cost of $200 per family. Total costs for these 90 million
families would be about $18 billion (90 million x $200).
In transitional economies, land costs for the 130 million households lacking
secure land rights should be nominal or zero since this land is already owned
by the state or by the collective. Thus, total land costs for the 230 million
households would be roughly $22 billion ($18 billion + $4 billion + 0).
In addition to these land costs, the basic complementary measures already
described (extending simple roads and electricity lines, providing agricultural
extension services, etc.) might average about $400 per full-size farm
beneficiary, $100 per homestead plot beneficiary, and $100 per beneficiary
family in transitional economies. (The bulk of the beneficiary families in
transitional economies are in China, most of which are already served by
simple roads and electrification.) This produces a total incremental cost of
$26 billion ($4 billion + $9 billion + $13 billion).
Finally, administrative and institutional capacity-building costs for
effective program implementation might equal roughly 30 percent of the total,
or $14.4 billion (30 percent of the sum $22 billion + $26 billion). Thus, we
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roughly estimate the grand total to be $62.4 billion ($22 billion + $26 billion
+ $14.4 billion). The roughly estimated $62.4 billion equates to an average
cost of just $270 per beneficiary family. The total amount is more than
nominal, but it is difficult to imagine other development investments that are
likely to produce greater returns per unit of financing. An investment of $270
per family has strong potential for helping 230 million of the world’s poorest
families overcome poverty, contribute more fully to economic growth, and
resist calls to pursue radical politics or violence as a solution to their plight.

VIII. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DONORS
In the context of these new options, and given the scope of the present
needs, what are the policy implications for the industrialized democracies?
How can the industrialized democracies encourage the introduction and
implementation of land reform programs in countries where such programs
are greatly needed?
The starting point, of course, must be the renewed recognition that access
to land and secure land rights play a crucial role, both in development and in
the assurance of political stability and world order. Given that fundamental
recognition as a premise for action, one must consider even the total resource
needs of $62.4 billion suggested above to be relatively modest.
Foreign donors should stand ready to provide important support affecting at
least three of the major variables likely to determine whether land reform
occurs in a given country.
First, aid donors should provide technical assistance and financial support
to indigenous non-governmental organizations, labor organizations, and other
broad-based groups that are able to conduct essential grassroots education and
organizing on the land reform issue.
Second, aid donors should provide technical assistance to government
policymakers on land reform benefits and on elements of program design and
administration, including a comparative perspective on what land reform
measures have been used in other countries. One consequence of the discrete
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and infrequent nature of land reform programs in a particular country is that
many of the countries where it is needed have had little experience or
knowledge of how to design or implement an effective land reform program.
Some technical assistance can also help inform broader public education
programs regarding the economic and social benefits of land reform.
Finally, of vital importance to most of the traditional less-developed
countries where land reform is needed, aid donors should provide financial
support to land reform programs that states are actually implementing,
including resources for landowner compensation (in cases of mandatory
expropriation) or land purchase (in cases of voluntary market-assisted
programs).
Such assistance is most effective when the donor and the state identify the
necessary financial resources in advance, so that a state considering land
reform knows what resources are available. Moreover, aid donors should
consider providing all financial assistance on a “progress payments” basis, so
that resources are released based on progress—only as land is actually
acquired and redistributed to the targeted agricultural families. This release of
funds should come only as each increment of progress has been confirmed by
independent random sample monitoring.
Traditional less-developed countries should provide a significant part of the
total resources needed for land reform. Assuming that the recipient countries
could fund at least one-third of the total $62.4 billion needed, and assuming
that a program of this scope would be spread over ten years, the industrialized
democracies would need to provide roughly $42 billion or about $4.2 billion a
year. This is about 5 percent of current official development assistance
(“foreign aid”) given by all the industrialized democracies. If distributed
according to the proportions by which the industrialized democracies
currently contribute to foreign assistance, the United States share, for
example, would come to around $1 billion a year, representing a
proportionate increase of roughly 5 percent of the recent U.S. foreign aid
budgets of about $19 billion a year.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Land Reform in the Twenty-First Century

IX. CONCLUSION
The case for land reform is compelling. The experience of many
countries shows the crucial role of land reform in providing not only a
source of income, security, and status for the non-landowning rural poor,
but also as a foundation for broader rural development and political
stability. Accumulated experience also provides responses to the current
challenges of land reform that are highly likely to be both affordable and
politically feasible over the coming years.
Land reform in many settings thus appears both necessary and
achievable. The stakes are considerable, both for the traditional developing
countries, the transitional economies, and, not least, the industrialized
democracies. Successful efforts to assure secure rights to land, even in
small quantities, to the roughly 230 million farm households on our planet
who stand in need of such land rights could make a mid- to long-term
difference of almost incalculable magnitude to the kind of planet we will
live on and that our children will inherit.
The one option that appears decisively foreclosed is neglect.
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